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Abstract 
One of the prerequisites for a supply chain network is the existence of a focal company, which 
possesses power to coordinate the network in order to realize its strategic objectives. Power 
represents one of the major elements of the supply chain management and seems to have been 
treated in the literature in contrasting ways from the two sides “dark” and “bright”. Using 
literature review we examine how these sides of power affect supply chain management from 
the viewpoint of the focal company with specific attention to coordination and cooperation 
issues and whether it can be used as a tool to promote the overall supply chain effectiveness. 
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1 Introduction   
Strictly coordinated chain organizations have evolved in the agri-food business since many 
years. In this connection, one of the prerequisites for a supply chain network is the existence 
of a focal company. The other network actors are more or less heavily dependent on the focal 
company because of long-lasting explicit or implicit contracts. If the resources of one party 
are essential to the other party, then this dependence puts the controlling party in a powerful 
position. Hence, one firm is more powerful than the other network firms, and power 
represents one of the major elements of the supply chain management. Power-created 
dependence can lead to opportunism by partners, and this can dissolve many of the relational 
elements that are necessary for the development of effective supply chain relationships.  
Our research on power focuses on the ability of an actor to influence the behaviour of other 
actors either by constructing the meaning of what other actors experience or by occupying a 
central location in a network of interdependent relationships that makes them functionally 
indispensable. The role of power is therefore crucial, in the sense that through its interactions 
with other constructs of the relationship atmosphere, it can seriously hamper cooperation. The 
concept of power has been treated in contrasting ways in the literature, and it seems that 
power has two sides “dark” and “bright”. On one side power imbalance existing in supply 
chain relationships creates opportunities for more powerful firms to act opportunistically by 
exercising coercion, which may ultimately undermine trust within the relationship. However, 
the positive role of power can be seen in promoting the effective coordination of channel 
relationships (FRAZIER/SUMMERS, 1986) and in being used as a tool to promote supply chain 
integration and to achieve higher levels of performance (MALONI/BENTON, 2000).  
KUMAR (2005) asserts that it is meaningless to talk about “power”, one needs to be specific on 
the nature of the power structure and its conduct. FRENCH and RAVEN (1959) expressed a 
view that the actual effect of power will depend on the different sources of power, which 
essentially define the resources available to influence decisions about the relationship. 
According to these statements we assume that the use of different sources of power has 
different effects on supply chain management and specifically on coordination and 
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chain networks and how it affects supply chain management with specific attention to 
coordination and cooperation, and whether power can be utilized as a tool to promote the 
overall supply chain effectiveness.  
The aim of our work is to investigate the role of power in supply chain networks. The 
structure of our work is derived from its aim. We firstly introduce the framework of supply 
chain networks and, focusing on the existence of focal company and supply chain 
management. Further on, we study the phenomena of power, present common views and 
definitions as well as classification of power according to different criteria, and elaborate on 
its role in supply chain relationships specifically on its effects on cooperation and 
coordination. Due to its central position we will focus hereby on the focal company’s 
perspective. At last, we summarize our findings. 
2  Supply Chain Networks and their Management 
2.1   Focal company 
Usually food products are produced not in vertically integrated food chains, but rather in 
vertical cooperating networks. So in terms of agribusiness, a special kind of networks with a 
certain set of characteristics which makes them strategic networks can be defined as “supply 
chain networks” (HANF/KÜHL, 2005). VAN DER VORST et al. (2005) refers to a supply chain 
network as to a food supply network and calls it an interconnected system with a large variety 
of complex relationships such as alliances, horizontal and vertical cooperation, forward and 
backward integration in supply chains. Supply chain networks can also be characterized as 
firms that are embedded within a complex network of horizontal (i.e. strategic alliances, joint-
ventures) and vertical (buyer and supplier) relationships (LAZZARINI et al., 2001; OMTA et al., 
2001). Therefore, supply chain networks represent strictly coordinated food systems, 
consisting of a focal company, which is responsible for coordination and other elements, such 
as suppliers, consumers and logistic services (LORENZI/BADEN-FULLER, 1995). In this way, a 
focal company has a central role in material and information flows and has to decide what to 
make and what to buy. 
Thus, being the core element the focal company has to have the power to align the actions of 
the network partners so that it has the ability to manage the network in order to realize the 
strategic objectives. Therefore, it has to consider how to structure its supply network in the 
most efficient way. GADDE and HÅKANSSON (1993) suggest that a focal company can 
structure its supplier network in two different ways. One way is according to how the 
suppliers can be organised, and the other is according to the number of suppliers. A focal 
company can organise the suppliers into systems of suppliers, with suppliers on different tiers 
depending on their activities and resources. One of the goals with systems of suppliers is that 
the number of suppliers, which are in direct contact with the focal company, is reduced. Focal 
firms tend to foster multiclient relationships with their suppliers, with single-client 
relationships being rare and limited to very small firms.  
Moreover, being the strategic centre the other network actors are more or less heavily 
dependent on the focal company because of (long lasting) explicit or implicit contracts. 
However, the focal company is also dependent upon the different resources that the suppliers 
can provide. Possessing power to align the actions of the network partners and representing 
the ability to coordinate the network, focal company has to fulfill these tasks in order to 
realize the strategic objectives of the network using successful supply chain management 
concepts.  
 2.2   Supply Chain Management 
Supply chain management can be viewed as the integrated creation oriented to process, 
planning, winding up and supervision of material, information and finance streams over the 
whole added value network in the cooperation with all involved partners with the purpose of 
the optimization. Thus, supply chain management is the integration of key business processes 
from end user through original suppliers that provide products, services, and information that 
add value for customer and other stakeholder. 
The main two areas of interest when talking about supply chain management are cooperation 
and coordination. Problems of cooperation arise from conflicts of interest. Driven by self-
interest partners often behave opportunistically (CAMERER/KNEZ, 1996; 
HEATH/STAUDENMAYER, 2000). As a matter of fact, the problem of cooperation often 
represents a problem of motivation. It is resolved by aligning interests through formal 
mechanisms such as contracting (WILLIAMSON, 1975). Informal mechanisms such as 
identification and embeddedness may also serve to align interests (GRANOVETTER, 1985; 
GULATI, 1995; GULATI/SYTCH, 2005). At the same time coordination problems arise due to 
the lack of shared and accurate knowledge about the decision rules that others are likely to use 
and how one’s own actions are interdependent with those of others (GEANAKOPLOS, 1992; 
MILGROM/ROBERTS, 1992). Cooperation problems are rooted in motivation, whereas 
coordination problems arise due to the limitations of participating actors that hinder them 
from possessing comprehensive knowledge of how others will behave in situations of 
interdependence. 
In sum, supply chain networks are of pyramidal-hierarchical structure with an existing “chain 
captain”. This focal company must have the power to align the actions and interests of the 
remainders of network participants. 
3  Notion of Power  
3.1   Definition of Power 
What is “power”? Most people believe to know the meaning of this phenomenon. However, 
BIERSTEDT (1950) claims that we all know perfectly well what it is until someone asks us. 
BACHARACH and LAWLER (1980) say that “power is necessarily a vague, poorly defined 
‘primitive’ term that serves best merely to sensitize us to aspects of the bargaining process 
that might otherwise go unremarked… thus we must ask not what is power, but to what 
phenomena does the notion of power sensitize us.” Generations of philosophers, political 
scientists, sociologists, psychologists, and economists have tried to elaborate on the concept 
of power and to define this notion from different perspectives and have not yet been able to 
come to a consensus.  
The phenomenon of power has occupied the minds of many philosophers and writers. 
Friedrich Nietzsche draws a parallel between power and life and sees in power the basis 
which motivated all living creatures to live. According to his view “every specific body 
strives to become master over all space and to extend its force (its will to power) and to thrust 
back all that resists its extension”. Power can be also associated with fear: “you see what 
power is - holding someone else’s fear in your hand and showing it to them!” (TAN, 1952). In 
this way it seems like power is generally defined as “capability” “of achieving own interest” 
(RUSSELL, 1938) or “to produce intended and foreseen effects on others” (WRONG, 1979). 
In the psychological context power is viewed as an ability to change the behavior of others 
(MCCLELLAND 1975) or “to modify the conduct of other individuals or groups” (BLAU 1967, 
KANTER 1977, TAWNEY, 1931). So the fact that the desires and the will of the power holder come first or serve as a motive for his actions even in spite of the existing resistance, becomes 
obvious from these statements.  
Being a part of a society individuals tend to interact with others and have social relationships 
with them. One of the fundamental definitions of power as a social phenomenon could be the 
one of WEBER (1947) who defines power as “the probability, in a social relationship, to 
impose one’s own will even against resistance regardless of the basis on which this 
probability rests”. One has to say that most conceptions of power are founded on this one of 
Weber’s (BUCKLEY, 1967; BREDEMEIER/STEPHENSON 1962). Another important characteristic 
applied to power in the social context is that power is viewed not just as “ability”, but also as 
“potential”. For example, BIERSTEDT (1950) says that “it may seem redundant to say so, but 
power is always potential” and, thus power can be conceptualized as a potential for influence. 
Political scientists have also made their contribution to the development of the body of 
literature on power. One of them, which is most often referred to, is the definition of DAHL 
(1986). He defines power as “the ability of one individual or group to get another unit to do 
something that it would not otherwise have done”. This perspective is also shared by other 
researchers (SALANCIK/PFEFFER, 1977; STANFIELD/CARROLL, 2004). Some of the authors 
(LASSWELL/KAPLAN 1950) are even more specific to the subject of how such outcomes can be 
achieved. For example, Sharp (1980) refers to power as “the totality of means, influences, and 
pressures - including authority, rewards, and sanctions - available for use to achieve the 
objectives of the power-holder”. From this perspective power appears to be formidable and 
even negative. However, WILSON (1913) sees some positive sides in it. According to his 
statement “power consists in one’s capacity to link his will with the purpose of others, to lead 
by reason and a gift of cooperation”.  
Applied to the economic context power is defined similarly to the above mentioned views 
namely as “the ability to influence” with the exception that it refers to firms. For example, 
EMERSON (1962) defines it as “the ability of one firm to influence the intentions and actions 
of another firm” and RATNASINGHAM (2000) refers to it as “the capability of a firm to exert 
influence on another firm to act in a prescribed manner”. In general one can say that this 
influence concerns intentions, actions and decision making (WILKINSON, 1974) of other firms.  
There are also other perspectives formed by management, marketing and channel and network 
science literature. Managerial perspective asserts that power may be viewed as “ability” or 
“possibility” to “direct human, material and informational resources in certain activity 
(MACCALL, 1978) or to utilize and mobilize resources for the achievement of collective goods 
(GAMSON, 1968). It should be noted that most channel research has examined power in terms 
of the interdependencies of firms on resources (FRAZIER, 1983; HU/SHEU 2003). EL-ANSARY 
and STERN (1972) provide the following definition of power “ability of one channel member 
to control the decision variables of marketing strategies of another member in a different layer 
of channel”. Moreover, it is also often referred to as the ability to influence or induce changes 
in favor of the own interest (WILEMON 1972). Another interesting view is provided by 
network science. According to MURDOCH (1995) power is “the outcome of the strengths of 
associations between actors. The stronger the network the more powerful the translating 
actor... those who are powerful  are not those who ‘hold’ power but are those able to enroll, 
convince, and enlist others into  networks on terms which allow the initial  actors to 
‘represent’ the others.”  
The examination of the definitions of power from different perspectives allows us to conclude 
that the notion of power is seen very similarly in different sciences with a difference of a 
context in which it is applied. Power is present everywhere – in human relations, society and 
state, channels and networks. It always has a power holder, a target and a source. It generally 
refers to the ability, capacity or potential to get others do something, to command, to 
influence, to determine or to control the behaviors, intentions, decisions or actions of others in the pursuit of one’s own goals or interests despite resistance. Furthermore, it refers to the 
capability to induce changes, to mobilize resources, and to restructure situations. 
3.2  Classification of Power  
3.2.1   “Power over” and “Power to” 
As mentioned above, all definitions of power seem to use similar terms and have a common 
sense. However, all definitions of power can be divided into two groups: “power over” 
someone (WEBER, 1947) and “power to” act or do something (PALERMO, 2000; PARSONS, 
1963; HOLLOWAY, 2002). In the first case power represents a conflict relationship. For 
example, “A gets B to do what B would not otherwise have done”. Therefore, A is more 
powerful than B, because it possesses the means which possibly threaten or make B to act in 
the way which is favorable for A. This is a clear case of the “power over” relationship. 
However, let us assume that both actors have an unequal opportunity to achieve their goals 
and pursue their interests. “A has a greater capacity to achieve his goals than C has”. In that 
case we also say that A is more powerful that C, but it is not the case of a conflict 
relationship. This relationship can be called the “power to” rather than “power over” 
relationship, since the power of the power holder A is based on his freedom to pursue his 
interests in respect to C. 
ELLIOTT (1980) views the “power to” concept as a system property rather than as a property 
of individuals or groups, which enables the successful realization of system goals. He argues 
that the reason why management requires the “power over” is to ensure that it can control the 
activities and coordinate them with other areas of managerial activity, so as to safeguard the 
attainment of managerial objectives and goals. In other words, management requires “power 
over” in order to maintain its “power to” and realize systems goals. SODANO (2006) expresses 
the opinion that “power over” refers to the “dark side” of the concept, i.e. power as control, 
command, coercion, whereas “power to” refers to the “bright” side of the concept, i.e. power 
as possibilities, freedom, opportunities. It seems that both these conceptualizations of power 
are significant in understanding the nature of power. 
3.2.2   Power sources 
The power of one actor over another social actor is determined by the power sources available 
to the former (EL-ANSARY/STERN 1972; SIMON 1953). A firm’s total power can be a 
combination of several kinds of power. FRENCH and RAVEN (1959) identified five types of 
power, each based on its source or origin: coercive, reward, expert, legitimate, and referent 
power.  
Coercive power enables an individual to mediate punishments to others. For example, to 
dismiss, suspend, reprimand them, or make them carry out unpleasant tasks. It is usually 
based on the expectation of punishments and/or threats and relies on the belief that 
punishments will be forthcoming or rewards will be withheld unless the requested behavior is 
exhibited (FRENCH/RAVEN, 1959; BLAU, 1967). In the supply chain network context coercive 
power reflects the fear of a network member to be punished if he fails to comply with the 
requirements of the focal company. However, consistent use of punishments and/or threats 
may encourage the affected firm to dissolve the trading relationship; because of this, coercive 
power is normally employed when the power advantage is clear and the influenced party’s 
alternatives are limited (BOWERSOX et al., 1980). 
Reward power depends on the ability of the power holder to offer or mediate rewards to 
others. It is based on the degree to which the individual can give others a reward of some kind 
such as recommendations, desired gifts, and increases in pay or responsibility. If a focal 
company can mediate rewards due to the access to resources which are valuable for other supply chain network actors, then it can make the actors to perform in the way the company 
desires. A firm’s ability to use rewards as a source of power may increase after rewards have 
actually been employed, because the perceived probability of the promise to deliver is 
intensified (CARTWRIGHT, 1965). 
Expert power (also called informational) is derived from the skills or special knowledge of an 
individual or a group in a specific subject. This knowledge applies to the restricted area in 
which the specialist is trained or qualified. The degree of power depends on the scarcity and 
the need of theses skills for others. It is worth to mention that this source of power may 
generate a response of trust and credibility. In case with a supply chain network the expert 
power of a focal company can be achieved if the network actors perceive or believe that it 
possesses a special knowledge  valuable for them. For example, manufacturers are often 
expected to have special knowledge about new products and promotion to assist the dealers. 
Legitimate power stems from internalized values which dictate that there is a legitimate right 
to influence and an obligation to accept this influence. This kind of power is based on some 
kind of a commonly accepted code or standard and usually involves positions and not 
personal qualities of individuals. It is also called position power and usually accompanied by 
various attributes of power such as uniforms, offices etc. It is based on the belief by one firm 
that another firm has the 'right' to prescribe behavior (FRENCH/RAVEN, 1959). A focal 
company in this case should be recognized in the eyes of the network members as having a 
“right” to make specific decisions and expect compliance with regard to these decisions. 
Referent power is based on an individual’s ability to be attractive for others and build loyalty 
and depends on the charisma and interpersonal skills of the power holder. French and Raven 
define the source of referent power as “a feeling of oneness… or a desire for such an 
identity”. Identification can be said to occur when an individual accepts influence because he 
wants to establish or maintain a satisfying self-defining relationship to another person or a 
group (KELMAN, 1958). It is difficult to identify specific instances of pure referent power in 
interfirm relationships; referent power usually occurs in conjunction with some other form of 
power and plays a stabilizing role (BEIER/STERN, 1969). In the supply chain context this 
power is observed when network actors want to join a network. 
HUNT and NEVIN (1974) dichotomized French and Raven’s power bases into coercive and 
non-coercive sources. While coercive sources of power arise from punishment, non-coercive 
sources arise from rewards or high quality assistances. 
We have described the classification of power sources (coercive, reward, expert, legitimate, 
and referent) which seem important to us for applying them in the context of supply chain 
relationships and supply chain management. Within the framework of our paper we adopt the 
coercive/noncoercive grouping of the sources. We believe that such distinct identification and 
clarification of the power sources is necessary, because the different sources of power affect 
supply chain relationships in contrasting ways, and because we believe that it can give more 
insight into different sides of power and its effects upon coordination and cooperation in 
supply chain networks. 
4  Role of Power in Supply Chain Networks 
4.1   The Two Sides of Power 
As we mentioned before, power seems to have two sides “dark” and “bright” and the opinions 
about the effects of power on exchange relationships are very contradictory. There are those 
that view the concept of power as alien to the effective workings of exchange relationships 
and success and state that power negates cooperation (DONEY/CANNON, 1997; BRETHERTON/ 
CARSWELL, 2002). GUMMESSON (1999) considers power imbalance to be detrimental to 
sustaining a business relationship. NAUDÉ and BUTTLE (2000) express the common view of it to be a negative influence and not helpful in the building of relationship quality; where the 
most important attributes of a good supply chain relationship are cited as being trust, 
integration, mutual understanding of needs, profit and satisfaction. KUMAR et al. (1998) also 
view power as the antithesis of trust, and that power is only viewed in a negative sense. 
On the other hand, power is viewed in a positive sense. There are a number of others who 
argue that power is vital, because it can take the relationship out of the realm of chance and 
give it purpose, order, and direction (DWYER et al., 1987; KUMAR, 2005). CONDLIFFE (1944) 
says that power, involving the possible use of force, is not necessarily evil but may be used to 
achieve moral purposes. Other researchers have emphasized the role of power in providing for 
effective coordination of the exchange relationship, rather than its potential for exploitation. 
BLAU (1967) provides the underlying foundation for this viewpoint. In a marketing channels 
context, STERN and HESKETT (1969) theorize that the exercise of power can have a positive 
role in the achievement of integration, adaptation, and goal attainment within the channel 
system. BIERSTEDT (1950) suggests that power stands behind every association and sustains 
its structure, without power there is no organization, no order. 
4.2   The “Dark” Side of Power 
Some researchers have argued that a high level of power will lead its possessor to exploit the 
other party by frequent use of relatively coercive influence strategies (BANNISTER 1969; 
ROBICHEAUX/EL-ANSARY 1975). Therefore, power imbalance existing in supply chain 
relationships creates opportunities for more powerful firms to act opportunistically by 
exercising coercion, which may ultimately undermine trust within the relationship. BALDWIN 
(1971) states that “fear, anxiety, and resistance are typical responses to threats, … if A uses 
negative sanctions today, B will tend to be less willing to cooperate with A in the future”. A 
consequence of such situation could be the inevitable. When one party is threatened by the 
balance of power, that weaker party will be more likely to seek alternative alliances 
(IRELAND/WEBB, 2007). 
At this point it seems that the use of the “power over”, being referred to as control, command, 
coercion, may diminish the relationships in supply chain networks. So coercion may represent 
the “dark” side of power. The works of HUNT and NEVIN (1974) has indicated that coercive 
power sources (punishments) are related positively to intrachannel conflict and inversely to 
dealer satisfaction, whereas noncoercive power sources exhibit the opposite relationships.  
It can also be assumed that reward power may have an element of coercion in it and can, 
therefore, have the same effect of relationships as coercive power. The overly frequent use of 
reward power is likely to damage relational norms (BOYLE et al., 1992) and cooperation 
(SKINNER et al., 1992). 
The fact that other power sources may not necessarily be good for supply chain relationships 
is also reflected by ETGAR (1976). He states that expertise, referent, and legitimate power 
sources may be less effective than reward and coercive power sources because they are less 
flexible and can often be viewed as being unrelated to specific performance by channel 
members. Their effectiveness may decline over time. For example, expert advice, once given, 
may provide the channel member with the ability to operate without such assistance in the 
future. Also, high degrees of identification between dealers and suppliers may be associated 
with less channel control. 
Another major disadvantage of expertise, referent, and legitimate power sources is that they 
may have a more limited scope of applicability than rewards and penalties. Channel members 
may accept the control of a channel leader but only in specific, well-defined areas of 
operation. Thus, they might be willing to accept decisions about the introduction of new 
products if he is perceived to be expert in this field. Yet they may resist his attempts to impose 
controls over such decision areas as pricing or promotion. Besides, informational power if it is used for manipulative purposes, being based on deceit 
and opportunism, may destroy cooperation and have an overall negative effect on supply 
chain relationships. To add more to this point, the “power to” could have a similar effect on 
channel relationships. As it gives the power holder the freedom to act, it can lead to 
opportunism and free-riding by actors and may be destructive for long term relationships.  
4.3   The “Bright” Side of Power 
Having examined the “dark” side of power, now let us look at its “bright” side. In the 
previous subchapter we provided arguments that coercive power may be seen in the negative 
sense due to the expectation of punishments by the target. However, some authors who have 
emphasized the positive aspects of power argue that its possession need not suggest 
exploitation or frequent use of coercion (BLAU, 1967; STERN/HESKETT, 1969). Furthermore, 
though the use of coercive influence strategies has been hypothesized to weaken exchange 
relationships, reduce trust, and invite retaliation (BUCKLIN, 1973; RAVEN/KRUGLANSKI, 
1970), empirical evidence on these issues is limited. In contrast, other researchers have 
emphasized the role of power in providing for effective coordination of the exchange 
relationship, rather than its potential for exploitation. BLAU (1967), in an intraorganizational 
context, provides the underlying foundation for this viewpoint. 
Obviously, the exercise of non-coercive power does not include any aggressive elements 
which may produce friction in the relationship. On the contrary, it fosters a relatively high 
level of agreement between the interacting parties, since to a large extent it contains the 
‘inherent desirability’ of performing certain actions (FRAZIER/SUMMERS, 1984). Moreover, 
the use of noncoercive power helps to increase financial and social benefits, through, for 
example, the offering of financial rewards, provision of assistance, and access to specialized 
information (WILKINSON, 1979). Therefore, this kind of power can help to promote common 
interests and collective goals within the relationship, as well as enhance a friendly and 
constructive atmosphere.  
A number of scientists found that the use of non-coercive power sources results in a greater 
level of satisfaction with the exchange relationship on the part of the firm receiving the 
influence attempt than does the use of coercive power (HUNT/NEVIN, 1974; LUSCH, 1977); 
that noncoercive power sources are inversely and coercive sources directly related to the 
existence of interfirm conflict (LUSCH, 1976; WILKINSON, 1981); and that the use of non-
coercive power sources is positively related to the performance of the firm which is subjected 
to the influence attempt (SIBLEY/MICHIE, 1981). Furthermore, scholars who have studied 
power suggested that non-coercive sources of power provide better alternatives for enhancing 
the satisfaction of less powerful trading partners (HUNT/NEVIN, 1974; LUSCH, 1976). 
The positive effect of legitimate and informational power can also be observed in providing 
an effective coordination of exchange relationships, as the distribution of power has become 
legitimate over time (FRAZIER/ANTIA, 1995; KALAFATIS, 2000). Informational power is also 
claimed to have a positive effect on channel and network relationships, as it helps to build 
trust and cooperation, and enhances positive attitudes toward the long-term channel 
relationships relationship. Similarly, the “power to” representing the freedom of action for 
network members can also be seen positive in promoting trust and cooperation in supply 
chain relationships.  
Some authors see the “bright” side of power in promoting coordination in supply chain 
relationships. BACHMANN (2001) states that power can be seen as a mechanism for 
coordinating social interactions efficiently and for allowing relatively stable relationships to 
develop between cooperating social actors. Besides, STERN and E1-ANSARY (1992) asserts 
that channel members use power to determine who will undertake which marketing activities, 
coordinate the performance of these tasks, and manage conflict among themselves. For example, when incomplete contracts fail, power can intervene and let the transaction work 
out. GASKI (1986) states that it is through reward and coercive power sources, that partner 
perceptions (such as expert, referent, and legitimate power sources) are managed to create 
harmonious and enduring interorganizational exchange relationships.  
Therefore, power can be seen as an effective tool in correcting organizational problems, 
solving conflicts and promoting harmonious interorganizational  relationships, which 
ultimately results in enhanced performance for the channel as a whole as well as its individual 
members. 
5 Summary 
Supply chain networks and their management have been introduced in the research strand of 
agricultural economics since many years. However, works on power in supply chain networks 
have been scanty. We have tried to give an overview of the notion of power from different 
perspectives (political, social, psychological, philosophical and economic) and discovered that 
power is mainly seen as the ability, capacity or potential to get others do something, to 
command, to influence, or to control the behaviors, intentions, decisions or actions of others 
in the pursuit of one’s own goals or interests, as well as to induce changes, to mobilize 
resources, to restructure situations, etc. 
We have examined different definitions of power by dividing them into two groups “power 
over” (control, command, coercion) and “power to” (possibilities, freedom, opportunities). 
Analyzing the different sources of power (coercive, reward, expert, legitimate, and referent) 
we have also found that they can be grouped into coercive and noncoercive ones. Doing so, 
we assumed that such distinct classification of power would help to determine its different 
effects on supply chain relationships. Using this dichotomy we have seen that power has 
many multi-faceted effects on coordination and cooperation in supply chain relationships. 
Thus, power can be viewed as having both positive and negative effects on supply chain 
management i.e. that power has the “dark” and the “bright” sides in supply chain networks.  
In this paper we have analyzed power mainly from the view point of the focal company facing 
the task to manage the supply chain network. For future research we would like to examine 
the effects of power from the point of view of both power holder and power targets and focus 
on testing our assumptions empirically by using structural equation modeling.  
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